Constitutional Court
21 September 2006
Facts
The case was initiated by the Vilnius Regional Court and a group of members of the Parliament. They asked to examine the constitutionality of the procedural provisions of the law relating to the hearing of cases at the appellate instance, to the possibility of adopting and publishing the final acts of the court without reasons, only by explaining orally the reasoning of the final act, and by writing the reasons afterwards, and to the adoption of a decision when a party is not participating in the procedure.
Complaint
The group of Parliament members argued that the Constitution requires the court to write and publish the reasons for its decision immediately, rather than first adopting and publishing the decision and then, at a later date, adding reasons to it. Furthermore, in the applicant's view, judges must not be subject to the influence of other persons, such as court officials, when drafting judgments: if the court writes the reasons for the judgment at a later stage, it may be influenced by the president of the court or of the division.
According to the applicant, the Civil Procedure Code is incompatible with the Constitution in so far as it provides for a default judgment which is final, even though it is based on a formal assessment of the evidence adduced in the case, and consists only of an introductory part, an operative part and a shortened statement of reasons. Moreover, in accordance with the constitutional principles of equality of arms and the rule of law, a party cannot be prevented from reviewing the lawfulness of a decision of a court of first instance in accordance with the procedure laid down by law, particularly where that decision was adopted in circumstances which are unfavourable to objectivity and reasonableness (in the absence of the party seeking review, without the party concerned being present and without the opportunity of making submissions).
Court‘s ruling
The Court emphasised that the requirement of integrity of a final judicial act expresses a characteristic of that act without which it would not be an act of justice. The requirement of integrity means that the operative part of such an act must always, without exception, be based on the circumstances and the reasoning, and that the act must always be signed by all the judges who heard the case. The Court observes that the drafting of any final judgment before it is formally adopted (i.e. voted on and signed by the judges) and made public is not an end in itself, but a means of ensuring that all the facts relevant to the case are ascertained precisely before the final judgment in question is formally adopted and made public.
The Court noted that the key point is not that the entire final judgment must be read aloud in the courtroom, with the exception of the introductory and operative parts, which must always be read aloud in the courtroom (with exceptions), but that, that it is drawn up in its entirety before the formal adoption of that final judgment, before the judges have voted on it and signed it, and before that final judgment has been made public, and that immediately after the hearing at which the final judgment in question is delivered, immediately, i.e. the parties to the proceedings, as well as the parties to the proceedings who are directly affected by the final judgment, and the authorities responsible for the enforcement of the judgments in question, as soon as possible. The mere reading aloud in the courtroom of the introductory and operative parts of the final act and the statement of the arguments - the reasons for its adoption - in support of that final act, even if very brief, cannot in itself be regarded as violating the constitutional imperatives of justice and the public nature of the law, or as departing from the constitutional concept of the court as an institution which administers justice on behalf of the Republic of Lithuania. The Court ruled that some provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Civil Procedure Code and the Law on Administrative Proceedings, which provide that final acts of the court may be adopted and published without reasons or only by orally explaining the arguments (reasons) of the final act of the court, and that the reasons may be written later, are contrary to the Constitution.
When deciding on the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, according to which, according to the applicant - Vilnius Regional Court, the Court of Appeal may not go beyond the limits set in the appeal when hearing a case and when it sees that the public interest so requires, the Court stated that the public interest is not considered to be any legitimate interest of a person or a group of persons, but rather only such an interest that reflects and expresses the fundamental values of society as enshrined in the Constitution, and which is protected and protected by the Constitution (e. g, openness and harmony of society, justice, individual rights and freedoms, the rule of law). Where the decision as to whether a particular interest is to be regarded as a public interest and defended and protected as a public interest is to be taken by the court deciding the case, reasons must be given for this. Otherwise, there would be a reasonable doubt that what the court is defending and protecting as a public interest is in fact not a public interest but a private interest of a particular person. The law does not provide for an exhaustive list of cases in which the court is permitted to protect the public interest by going beyond the limits of the appeal, or for a list of cases in which the court is precluded from protecting the public interest by going beyond the limits of the appeal. The Court ruled that the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are contrary to the Constitution, the constitutional principles of the rule of law and justice.
In deciding on the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure establishing the institute of default judgment, the Court stated that default judgment is a specific method of settling disputes in a civil case, where one of the parties to the proceedings withdraws from participation in the proceedings (e.g., the defendant or the plaintiff fails to appear at the hearing of the court where the civil case is to be heard, or the defendant fails to file a statement of defence to the claim), the case is heard and the judgment is rendered in the absence of that party. The Court noted that the institution of a default judgment is intended to create legal preconditions for the implementation of the principles of economy and concentration in civil proceedings. The purpose of the decision by default is, among other things, to prevent delays in civil proceedings and to prevent parties to proceedings from abusing their procedural rights. Therefore, such an institution is not in itself unconstitutional.
The Court noted that the law must not only establish the right of a party to the proceedings to appeal against the final judgment of the court of first instance to at least one higher court but also establish a procedure for appeal which allows the higher court to correct possible errors of the court of first instance. Otherwise, the constitutional principle of the rule of law would be violated, and the constitutional right of the individual to due process of law would be infringed.
The Court also held that even if all the conditions for a default judgment are met, the court has the power to decide whether to grant a default judgment. The Court held that the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are contrary to the Constitution, the constitutional principles of the rule of law and justice.