Европейский суд по правам человека
12 июля 2007 года
Facts
The applicant was arrested on returning to Germany from Bosnia on suspicion of having engaged in genocide in the Doboj region in 1992. The accusations against him included setting up a paramilitary group that had ill-treated and killed Muslim villagers and personally executing villagers.
Complaint
The applicant complained that his conviction for genocide by German courts, which he alleged had no jurisdiction over his case, and his ensuing detention amounted to a violation of Article 5 (1) (a) and Article 6 (1) of the Convention. The applicant further complained that the wide interpretation of the crime of genocide, as adopted by the German courts, did not have a basis in the wording of that offence as laid down in German and public international law, and that the German courts arbitrarily found that his guilt was of a particular gravity. He claimed that his conviction therefore amounted to a breach of Article 7 (1).
Court’s ruling
The German courts’ interpretation of the Genocide Convention and their establishment of jurisdiction to try the applicant on charges of genocide were widely confirmed by the statutory provisions and case-law of numerous other States and by the Statute and case-law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). ICTY Statute confirmed the German courts’ view providing for the concurrent jurisdiction of the ICTY and national courts without any restriction to domestic courts of particular countries. The German courts’ interpretation of the applicable provisions and rules of public international law was not arbitrary. They had therefore had reasonable grounds for establishing their jurisdiction to try the applicant on charges of genocide. It followed that the applicant had been tried by a “tribunal established by law” (Article 6 (1)) and been lawfully detained after conviction “by a competent court” (Article 5 (1) (a)).
While many authorities had favoured a narrow interpretation of the crime of genocide, there had already been several authorities which had interpreted it in a wider way, in common with the German courts. The applicant could therefore reasonably have foreseen, if need be, with the assistance of a lawyer, that he risked being charged with and convicted of genocide for his acts. In this context the Court also had regard to the gravity and duration of the acts the applicant had been found guilty of. The national courts’ interpretation of the crime of genocide could therefore reasonably be regarded as consistent with the essence of that offence and reasonably foreseeable by the applicant at the material time. Once those requirements were met, it was for the German courts to decide which interpretation of the crime of genocide under domestic law they wished to adopt.
Thus, the Court found no violations.